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Mistry, Dinshaw. The US-India nuclear agreement : diplomacy and domestic politics / Dinshaw Mistry. pages cm Summary: Examines the US-India nuclear deal negotiated from 2005 to 2008 and explains several puzzles related to it. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-1-107-07341-8 (Hardback) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation-Government policy-India. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation-Government policy-United States. 3. India. Treaties, etc. United States, 2008 October 8. 4 T his is a study of a very complex nuclear negotiation. The study examines how the United States and India negotiated a historic and politically contentious civilian nuclear agreement. The agreement changed longstanding US laws and non-proliferation regime guidelines to recognize India's nuclear status: through the agreement, India became the sixth country in the world that could retain nuclear weapons and still participate in civilian nuclear commerce. The Bush administration announced the agreement in July 2005 and completed it in late 2008.
Despite its importance, there are few comprehensive analyses of the USIndia nuclear agreement. This book fills this gap in scholarship by thoroughly examining the politics of the agreement. More significantly, it draws upon the well-established framework of two-level games, that combines diplomacy with domestic politics, to explain key puzzles in the US-India nuclear dialogue. This framework explains why Washington and New Delhi could not reach a nuclear agreement in the early 2000s and why, even after they announced an agreement in 2005, they could not complete it until 2008. Such an analysis also offers lessons for US nuclear negotiations with other countries and for the broader US strategic dialogue with India.
A number of individuals and organizations assisted with this manuscript. The Woodrow Wilson Center's fellowship program, its superb staff, its South Asia program directed by Bob Hathaway, and many friends and colleagues Further, a number of experts and participants in the nuclear dialogue offered their insights in research interviews and in comments on the draft manuscript: these were off the record and, without identifying them by name, I am especially grateful for their contributions. The reviewers of this manuscript also offered insightful comments. Doug Jackson at the Wilson Center provided much research support, and several political science colleagues offered helpful suggestions, including Jacques Hymans, Jacob Wilson, Ivan Ivanov, Joel Wolfe, and Rina Williams. I also acknowledge a long-standing debt to Barclay Ward, Sumit Ganguly and Stephen Cohen. They introduced me to the fields of nuclear affairs and South Asian security; they have been the best of mentors over the years; and they offered vital fellowship recommendations for and useful comments on this manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank all who assisted at Cambridge University Press with the publication of this book.
